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I. Introduction 
 
This paper presents an economic analysis of injunctive settlements – settlements that 
implement the terms of an injunction sought by the plaintiff.  The best known examples 
are observed in disputes over the infringement of property rights, such as nuisance 
litigation or patent infringement litigation. 
 
In the patent infringement context, a great deal of controversy today surrounds “reverse 
settlements”.  The reverse settlement involves a plaintiff (for example, a pharmaceutical 
company with a patent on a drug) paying the defendant (for example, a manufacturer of a 
generic drug) to settle the case.  The reverse settlement typically includes an agreement to 
implement the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff (for example, that the 
defendant will restrict sales of the allegedly infringing generic drug).  Reverse 
settlements are controversial because they involve settlement payments going in the 
reverse direction of that observed in routine litigation. 
 
This paper aims to extend the economic literature on settlement, and to draw some 
practical insights on reverse settlements.  The key contributions to the economic literature 
on settlements follow from the distinction drawn below between standard settlements, in 
which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit or constrain 
the defendant’s activity.  In many instances, both types of settlement are available to the 
parties.  Consideration of both types greatly expands the zone of mutually agreeable 
settlement arrangements beyond that in traditional economic analysis of settlements 
(Landes-Posner-Gould framework).  The analysis identifies the conditions under which 
injunctive settlements (rather than standard settlements) are likely to be observed and the 
conditions under which reverse settlements will be observed among the injunctive 
settlements.  Reverse settlements are likely when the stakes associated with the injunction 
are large relative to damages and litigation costs. 
 
The model challenges some of the established stories about the economics of settlement.  
The majority of cases settle in this framework not because the parties have the same 
beliefs regarding trial outcome, in addition to similar stakes, but because when the full 
range of potential settlement agreements is taken into account litigation is not a rational 
outcome in most cases.  And when the parties have the same beliefs regarding trial 
outcome, settlement will occur no matter how divergent the stakes. 
 
The analysis here applies to all types of litigation.  One result is that the reverse 
settlement is part of a family of remedial dispositions that includes the compensated 
injunction of Calabresi and Melamed (1972).  The injunctive settlements studied here 
could also describe settlements in which the parties agree to operate under alternative 
legal rules.  Such settlements could minimize the scope of inefficient legal rules and lead 
to the adoption of private norms in place of the law (Ellickson, 1991).  Widespread 
adoption of private norms could explain a tendency toward efficient common law (Rubin, 
1977). 
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III. Model 
 
In this part we examine the incentives driving parties to litigate and to settle when the 
lawsuit seeks both damages and an injunction (injunctive litigation).  The standard 
economic analysis of litigation examines the lawsuit for damages (standard litigation).  
We will refer to the settlement of injunctive litigation as an injunctive settlement, and to 
the settlement of standard litigation as a standard settlement. 
 
Injunctive and reverse settlements can be observed in any area of litigation in which 
plaintiffs seek to enjoin some activity of the defendant.  One common example appears in 
nuisance cases, where the plaintiff may sue for damages and to enjoin the defendant’s 
nuisance-generating activity.  A settlement could involve the defendant agreeing to 
discontinue his activity.  Another example is patent infringement litigation.  Since the 
economic analysis of litigation is familiar, we will refer to these examples as illustrations 
throughout this analysis. 
 
The litigation process is one in which the plaintiff files a complaint, which is then either 
settled or prosecuted to a final judgment.  The final judgment enjoins the defendant’s 
activity.   
 
Let Pp be the plaintiff’s perception of the probability of winning its complaint, Jp the 
payoff to the plaintiff and Cp the cost to the plaintiff.  Complaints are filed when the net 
reward from litigation is positive, PpJp – Cp > 0, a basic assumption in the economics of 
litigation (Shavell, 1982a).  The plaintiff’s perception of the probability of winning is 
determined by his prediction that the court will find that the defendant has violated the 
law.  In the nuisance setting, that determination will be based on a balancing test that 
examines several economic factors (Hylton, 2008).  In the patent infringement setting, the 
plaintiff’s perception will be determined by his prediction that the court will find that 
infringement has occurred, which is both a function of the patent’s validity and the nature 
of the defendant’s conduct.  
 
The plaintiff’s judgment is made up of two components, the gain the plaintiff gets from 
the injunction, Gp, and the damage award D.  A plaintiff will file a claim when the 
expected net gain from litigation is positive, 
 
(1)  Pp(Gp+D) – Cp > 0 . 
 
A suit may be filed even though the anticipated damage award is zero, provided that the 
plaintiff values the injunction (or the precedent effect) highly enough.  Conversely, a 
lawsuit may be filed even though the injunction, or precedent effect, is harmful to the 
plaintiff, provided the anticipated damage award is large enough to offset the harm.  For 
example, a plaintiff might sue to shut down a nuisance-generating enterprise even though 
its shuttering actually harms the plaintiff (say, because he loses his job).  Of course, the 
plaintiff could avoid the loss by not seeking the injunction.  But the plaintiff may prefer 
to seek the injunction because of its effect on the settlement value of the case. 
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A. Continued Prosecution of Complaints 
 
The defendant has to worry about the total cost of the lawsuit, which consists of the cost 
of an adverse finding and the cost of the process.  Let Pd represent the defendant’s 
prediction of the likelihood of a finding a violation, Cd the litigation cost borne by the 
defendant, and Jd the defendant’s assessment of the cost of the judgment.  The judgment 
consists of the loss to the defendant from the injunction and the damage award against 
him: Jd = Ld + D.  The total cost of the lawsuit to the defendant is therefore 
 
(2) Pd(Ld +D) + Cd . 
 
The total cost of litigation to the defendant may be substantial even if the anticipated 
damage award is negligible.  In the context of patent infringement litigation, the cost of 
the judgment to the defendant consists of the loss that results from being forced to cede 
the market plus the amount the defendant will be required to pay as compensation to the 
plaintiff. 
 
If the expected net gain to the plaintiff from the lawsuit (1) is less than the defendant’s 
total cost of litigation (2), the parties will settle.  Thus, settlement occurs when 
 
(3)  PpGp – PdLd + (Pp – Pd)D < Cp + Cd  ,  
 
which is the familiar settlement condition of the Landes-Posner-Gould model modified to 
take asymmetric stakes into account.1  Litigation is essentially a bet with process costs.  
The left hand side of (3) is the ex ante joint expected value of the lawsuit (the bet).  The 
bet is maintained until the payoff event only if the joint value exceeds the process costs. 
 
The joint value of the bet consists of two components: the injunction and the transfer of a 
fixed sum of money.  Think of the injunction as a token transferred from the defendant to 
the plaintiff.  The expected value of the token to the plaintiff is equal to his estimate of 
the probability of victory multiplied by the value of the token to him.  The joint value of 
the token transfer game is positive only if the plaintiff’s expected value exceeds the 
defendant’s. 
 
This analysis suggests that the economics of injunctive litigation are similar to the 
standard litigation analysis (Landes-Posner-Gould).  In the standard litigation scenario, 
consistent beliefs (Pp=Pd) implies that all cases settle, unless the parties have asymmetric 
stakes. 
 
                                                 
1 This assumes that the probability of an injunction is the same as the probability of an award of damages.  
That may not be valid in all cases.  For example, in nuisance litigation, courts are quicker to provide 
damages than they are to provide issue an injunction.  If the probabilities of a damage award and an 
injunction differ, the settlement condition changes to PpGp – PdLd + (Pp – Pd)D < Cp + Cd, where Pp and 
Pd represent the perceptions with respect to an injunction and Pp and Pd represent the perceptions with 
respect to damages.  To keep the model simple, we will stick with the assumption that the probability of 
damages is the same as the probability of an injunction.  The results are easily changed for the case in 
which the probabilities differ. 
 4
However, the Landes-Posner-Gould framework is incomplete in this setting.  In spite of 
the similarity between injunctive and standard litigation, there are substantial differences 
between the two.  The prospects for settlement in the injunctive context are not explained 
entirely by the Landes-Posner-Gould model, because the standard approach does not 
incorporate the incentives for a settlement in which the defendant agrees to forgo his 
preferred option (thus, forfeiting Ld) in order for the plaintiff to obtain his preferred 
outcome (obtaining Gp).  We consider these types of settlement below. 
  
B. Economics of Injunctive Settlements 
 
The economics of settlement in injunctive litigation are not fully explained by the 
traditional Landes-Posner-Gould model because it ignores settlements that implement the 
injunction sought by the plaintiff.  For example, in the patent infringement context, a 
settlement implementing the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff involves the 
defendant exiting the market to let the plaintiff firm sell at the monopoly price. 
  
1. Settlement Incentives: Standard versus Injunctive Settlements 
  
Recall that the plaintiff sues both to enjoin the defendant’s conduct and to obtain a 
damage judgment from the defendant.2  We will examine the standard settlement in 
which the defendant pays the plaintiff money in order to drop his lawsuit, and the 
injunctive settlement that implements the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff.   
 
a. Standard Settlements 
 
The standard settlement is achieved by the transfer of money from the defendant to the 
plaintiff in exchange for the plaintiff dropping his lawsuit.  A standard settlement will be 
reached under the Landes-Posner-Gould condition in (3).  Since the settlement payment 
must exceed the expected net reward to the plaintiff from suing, and since the expected 
net reward must be positive for the plaintiff to have a credible claim of suing, the 
standard settlement will involve a (positive) payment from the defendant to the plaintiff. 
 
b. Injunctive Settlements 
 
In the injunctive settlement, the defendant agrees to accept the terms of the injunction 
sought by the plaintiff.  The settlement results in a cost to the defendant that is equal to 
the sum of the settlement transfer and the defendant’s loss from the injunction.  
Settlement is desirable to the defendant if the total cost of the settlement to the defendant 
is less than the total cost of the lawsuit: 
 
(4)  S + Ld < Pd(Ld+D) + Cd  . 
 
                                                 
2 One case that we have not examined here is that in which the plaintiff brings a standard lawsuit for 
damages, and the parties reach an injunctive settlement.  This is an easy case to examine, and at the same 
time probably unlikely to occur.  The additional complications and expanded space may not be a 
worthwhile effort. 
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Settlement is desirable to the plaintiff if the sum of the transfer and the gain from the 
injunction exceed his net payoff from the lawsuit:  
 
(5)  S + Gp > Pp(Gp+D) – Cp. 
 
It follows that the injunctive settlement will be observed if 
 
(6)  (1–Pd)Ld – (1–Pp)Gp + (Pp–Pd)D < Cp + Cd . 
 
Injunctive litigation remains equivalent to a bet with process costs, involving the transfer 
of a token and fixed sum of money.  However, the joint valuation of the token (the 
injunction) changes in comparison to the standard settlement scenario.  The reason is that 
the injunctive settlement involves a voluntary transfer of the token from defendant to 
plaintiff.  Given this, the only thing that can happen of relevance in litigation is for the 
plaintiff to lose, leaving the token in the defendant’s hands.  The joint value of litigation 
is enhanced by this prospect only if the defendant’s expected gain from having the token 
awarded to him exceeds the plaintiff’s expected loss. 
 
The individual settlement incentive conditions (4) and (5) imply that the injunctive 
settlement, unlike the standard settlement, may require a negative settlement payment – 
i.e., from plaintiff to defendant.  This is the case of a reverse settlement. 
 
Example 1: Suppose the gain to the plaintiff (Gp) is $500 and the loss to the defendant 
(Ld) is $200. The cost of litigation is $10 for the plaintiff and $20 for the defendant.  The 
plaintiff and the defendant both believe that the probability of plaintiff victory is 75%.  
The damage award is $10.  In order to accept a settlement, the defendant has to consider 
whether the cost of settlement, S + $200, is less than the cost of litigation, (75%)($10) + 
(75%)($200) + $20 = $177.50.  Since an injunctive settlement will cost the defendant at 
least $200, he will prefer litigation unless the plaintiff pays him at least $22.50 in 
settlement.  Now consider the plaintiff.  In order to prefer the injunctive settlement to 
litigation the plaintiff considers whether the gain from the settlement, S + $500, is greater 
than the expected payoff from litigation, (75%)($500) + (75%)($10) – $10 = $372.50.  
Since the injunctive settlement guarantees the plaintiff $127.50 more than does litigation, 
the plaintiff is willing to pay as much as $127.50 for the settlement.  A settlement will be 
observed involving a reverse payment between $22.50 and $127.50 from the plaintiff to 
the defendant.  The key to the reverse settlement here is that the injunction is so costly to 
the defendant, relative to litigation, that he will not agree to it unless he receives a 
payment.  At the same time the injunction with certainty is so valuable to the plaintiff, 
relative to litigation, that he is willing to pay for it. 
 
An injunctive settlement can be achieved by the plaintiff sharing his gain with the 
defendant, rather than through the transfer of the settlement payment.  Such a settlement 
would be desirable to the plaintiff if the share of the gain from the injunction that the 
plaintiff retains exceeds his net payoff from the lawsuit – that is, if (1–)Gp > Pp(Gp+D) 
– Cp, where (1–) is the share retained by the plaintiff.  The settlement would be 
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desirable to the defendant if his net loss in settlement is less than the total cost of the 
lawsuit to the defendant – that is, if Ld – Gp < Pd(Ld+D) + Cd. 
 
Example 2: Return to the numerical assumption of Example 1, with  being the share of 
the plaintiff’s gain offered to the defendant in settlement.  The defendant has to consider 
whether $200 – ($500) < (75%)($10) + (75%)($200) + $20, or –(500) < –22.5.  The 
plaintiff considers whether (1-)($500) > $372.5.  If the plaintiff offers the defendant a 
share of the gain between .045 and .255, they will settle. 
 
Since the reverse settlement is particularly controversial, it is worthwhile to examine the 
conditions under which it will be observed.  Using (4) and (5), the reverse settlement will 
be observed when Ld > Pd(D + Ld) + Cd and Gp > Pp(D + Gp) – Cp, or equivalently, when 
(1–Pd)Ld > PdD + Cd and (1–Pp)Gp > PpD – Cp.  In less formal terms: 
  
Observation 1: A reverse (injunctive) settlement will be observed when the plaintiff’s gain 
from the injunction exceeds his expected net payoff from the lawsuit and the defendant’s 
loss from the injunction exceeds the expected total cost of the lawsuit to the defendant.3 
 
The reverse settlement is determined by the parties’ predictions of the likelihood of 
plaintiff victory and the size of the stakes (i.e., the plaintiff’s gain and the defendant’s 
loss from the injunction).  Reverse settlements are more likely when the parties think the 
plaintiff’s likelihood of victory is low and when the stakes are high (relative to damages 
and litigation costs). 
 
The intuition behind the reverse settlement is simple.  Assume the defendant’s loss from 
an injunction is large relative to the damages and litigation cost.  An injunctive settlement 
requires the defendant to bear the loss from the injunction with certainty, while litigation 
involves only a risk of such a loss.  Under these conditions, the defendant will often 
demand to be paid in order to accept the injunctive settlement.  If he is not paid, he will 
prefer to take the gamble of litigation.  Similarly, as the defendant becomes more 
optimistic (i.e., believes the plaintiff is more likely to lose), he will demand a payment in 
order to settle. 
 
Reverse settlements may signal a weak claim on the part of the plaintiff.  However, they 
may be observed even when the plaintiff has a strong claim if the stakes associated with 
the injunction are high.  Alternatively, a reverse settlement may be observed, even though 
the plaintiff believes he has a strong case, when the defendant is optimistic about his 
likelihood of victory (so must be paid to settle) and the plaintiff’s gain from the 
injunction is large.4 
                                                 
3 If the probabilities of a damage award and of an injunction differ (see note 1 supra), then the conditions 
for a reverse settlement change to (1–Pp)Gp > PpD – Cp and (1–Pd)Ld > PdD + Cd. 
4 The defendant optimism explanation is emphasized in Schildkraut (2004).  One example that may serve as 
an illustration of a case where the defendant is optimistic and the plaintiff’s gain from the injunction is 
large is the trademark dispute between Microsoft and Lindows (Holman, 2007, 501).  Microsoft sued 
Lindows for trademark infringement, alleging that the Lindows was confusingly similar to the Windows 
trademark.  A pretrial ruling permitted the jury to be instructed to consider whether “windows” was a 
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2. Comparing Injunctive and Standard Settlements 
 
An injunctive settlement may be possible under conditions in which a standard settlement 
may not be possible, and conversely.  Consideration of the two types of settlement 
enhances the set of potential settlement agreements.   
 
Intuition would suggest that that the injunction should be awarded to the plaintiff when 
the plaintiff’s gain from the injunction is greater than the defendant’s loss.  This is 
equivalent to awarding a property right to the party who values it the most.  It follows 
that a wealth-maximizing voluntary agreement would reach the same result.  That 
intuition is borne out in this model.  In particular, the injunctive settlement is more likely 
to occur than the standard settlement if the gain to the plaintiff from the injunction is 
greater than the loss to the defendant.  This is easily demonstrated: using (3) and (6), an 
injunctive settlement is more likely than the standard settlement if   
 
(7) (1– Pd)Ld – (1– Pp)Gp  < PpGp – PdLd   , 
 
which holds only when Ld < Gp . 
 
Settlement incentives for injunctive litigation are greater than in the standard analysis in 
which the only issue is whether money will be transferred from the defendant to the 
plaintiff.  Figure 2 shows the settlement incentive for different combinations of the 
plaintiff’s gain from the injunction and the defendant’s loss from the injunction.   
 
Figure 2 examines the case in which the plaintiff’s estimate of the probability of plaintiff 
victory exceeds the defendant’s estimate of that probability and the dispute would settle if 
it were only about monetary damages.5  The line SS shows the boundary on standard 
settlements.  Standard settlements will occur in the shaded space above SS.  Injunctive 
settlements will occur in the shaded space below IS.  Both types of settlement will be 
observed for loss-gain combinations in the intersection of the two shaded areas.  
Litigation to judgment will occur in the white pie-shaped region of the diagram.   
 
Incorporation of injunctive settlements in the analysis of litigation drastically reduces the 
set of outcomes in which litigation to judgment occurs.  In the standard settlement model, 
litigation to judgment would be observed for all of the gain-loss combinations below SS.  
With injunctive settlements taken into account, litigation occurs for only a fraction of 
those combinations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
generic term before Microsoft introduced its operating system software (Holman, at 502).  Rather than risk 
losing its trademark, Microsoft settled by making a reverse payment of $20 million to Lindows in exchange 
for Lindows agreeing to change its name (to Linspire) (Holman, at 502). 
5 Specifically, Figure 2 assumes Pp > Pd and (Pp – Pd)D < Cp + Cd.  There are two other parameter 
configurations to examine: (1) Pp > Pd and (Pp – Pd)D > Cp + Cd; and (2) Pp < Pd and (Pp – Pd)D < Cp + Cd .  
The “litigation cone” is larger in these two alternative diagrams.  In the first, the slopes of SS and IS are the 
same, but their intersection occurs in the third quadrant.  In the second configuration, the SS and IS curves 
switch places (in comparison to Figure 2), and the litigation cone covers the small positive and the negative 
values of Ld and Gp.  The parameter configuration Pp < Pd and (Pp – Pd)D > Cp + Cd is infeasible. 
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Consider the broader implications.  The standard analysis of settlement has led to the 
general view that the vast majority of cases settle because trial-outcome beliefs are 
similar and litigation stakes are similar.6  But incorporating injunctive settlements upends 
that story.  In this analysis, if trial outcome beliefs and stakes are randomly assigned 
settlements should still greatly outnumber the disputes going to litigation.  The 
observation that most cases settle does not necessarily imply symmetric stakes or similar 
trial-outcome beliefs in this analysis. 
                                                 
6 There is some controversy concerning the measurement of settlements.   Eisenberg & Lanvers (2008) 
report lower settlement rates than the common 90% estimate, and considerably variation in settlement rates 
across areas of litigation.  The model of this paper provides an approach to explaining variation in 
settlement rates across areas of litigation. 
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     Figure 2: Diagram of Litigation and Settlement Areas for Pp > Pd  
    and (Pp – Pd)D < Cp + Cd.
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3. Consistent Beliefs 
 
As we noted earlier, it has been argued that most legal disputes settle because the plaintiff 
and the defendant come to similar predictions of the likelihood of a plaintiff victory in the 
dispute.  For this reason we think it is important to examine the incentives for the 
different types of settlement in the case of consistent beliefs. 
 
Given consistent beliefs (Pp = Pd = P), the standard settlement condition is P(Gp – Ld) < 
Cp + Cd, so that a standard settlement occurs when 
 
(8)  Ld > Gp – (Cp + Cd)/P. 
 
An injunctive settlement will occur when 
 
(9)  Ld < Gp + (Cp + Cd)/(1–P) . 
 
These individual settlement conditions imply that some type of settlement is always 
feasible under.  The general message is as follows. 
 
Proposition 1: Under consistent beliefs, litigation to judgment will not occur.  All 
disputes will settle, whether stakes are asymmetric or not. 
 
This is not an implication of the Landes-Posner-Gould analysis.  In addition, this ignores 
strategic interactions and transaction costs, either of which could generate litigation under 
the conditions in which this model predicts that litigation will not occur. 
 
Before considering the detailed implications of Proposition 1, consider its implications 
for the literature on settlement and litigation.  One view advanced in the literature is that 
when beliefs are consistent, litigation will not occur unless the parties have asymmetric 
stakes.7  Deviations from the Priest-Klein (1984) theorem’s fifty percent win rate 
prediction are often explained on this basis.8  The argument runs as follows: when the 
trial outcome is least uncertain (not close to 50 percent), the parties’ beliefs will tend to 
be consistent most often, so litigation will not occur unless stakes are asymmetric.  To 
elaborate, let trial-outcome beliefs be generated according Pd = P + d, Pp = P + p, where 
d and p have mean zero (Hylton, 2006).  Substituting into (3), settlement occurs when 
P(Gp – Ld) + pGp – dLd + (p –d)D < Cp + Cd.  Under the Priest-Klein analysis, when the 
trial outcome is least uncertain (i.e., P is not close to fifty percent), the error variances 
will be small.  Thus, a significant deviation from the fifty percent win rate prediction 
would be due to the stakes asymmetry, where specifically Gp > Ld. 
                                                 
7 This view is obviously supported by the Landes-Posner-Gould condition (3).  If beliefs are consistent, the 
settlement condition simplifies to: P(Gp – Ld) < Cp + Cd, and clearly asymmetry in stakes is necessary for 
litigation to occur. 
8 For an empirical application of the asymmetric stakes theory, see Siegelman & Waldfogel (1999).  An 
alternative to the asymmetric stakes theory is the asymmetric information theory explored in Hylton (2006). 
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However, the analysis here shows that even if stakes are asymmetric, all disputes will 
settle when the parties have consistent beliefs.  This implies that when the full panoply of 
settlement agreements are taken into account, deviations from the 50 percent prediction 
cannot be explained by the existence of asymmetric stakes.9  To elaborate, if beliefs are 
generated according to Pd = P + d, Pp = P + p, then when injunctive settlements are 
taken into account there are two conditions governing settlement: P(Gp – Ld) + pGp – 
dLd +(p –d)D < Cp + Cd, and (1– P)(Ld –Gp) + pGp – dLd +(p –d)D < Cp + Cd.  Stakes 
asymmetry no longer provides an explanation, consistent with the Priest-Klein 
conjecture, for litigation that results in an average win rate that is different from 50 
percent. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of settlement outcomes under consistent beliefs.  Again, 
standard settlements occur in the region above SS.  Injunctive settlements occur in the 
region below IS.  Above IS, only standard settlements will occur.  Below SS, only 
injunctive settlements occur.  In the space between IS and the 45 degree line, both types 
of settlement can occur though standard settlements are more likely than injunctive 
settlements.  The converse holds for the space between SS and the 45 degree line.  It 
follows that for the consistent beliefs case: 
 
Observation 2: As the probability of plaintiff victory approaches one, the likelihood of an 
injunctive settlement increases relative to that of a standard settlement.  Conversely, as 
the probability of victory approaches zero, the likelihood of a standard settlement 
increases relative to that of an injunctive settlement.10 
 
Suppose the plaintiff’s probability of winning at trial approaches one.  Even if the 
plaintiff’s gain is less than the defendant’s loss, the injunctive settlement may be 
attractive because it avoids the cost of litigation.  The defendant is almost surely going to 
lose anyway, and the court will impose the injunction.  It follows then that as the 
plaintiff’s probability of victory approaches one, the injunctive settlement becomes 
increasingly attractive because it avoids litigation costs.  A similar litigation-cost-
avoidance argument applies to the case in which the plaintiff’s probability of victory 
approaches zero. 
 
                                                 
9 Rather than asymmetry in stakes, the explanation for litigation would have to be based on incomplete 
ownership or fragmentation of stakes, which is essentially a transaction-cost theory.  For further discussion, 
see the nuisance hypothetical in Example 3 of the text. 
10 In Figure 3, as P approaches one, IS shifts upward, expanding the range of conditions in which the 
injunctive settlement is feasible.  Similarly, as P approaches zero, SS shifts downward, expanding the range 
of conditions in which the standard settlement is feasible. 
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     Figure 3: Diagram of Litigation and Settlement Areas for  
    Consistent Beliefs Case
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III. Applications of Model 
 
The preceding analysis focused on the incentives for injunctive settlements and 
contrasting those incentives with the analysis of standard settlements.  Allowing for 
injunctive settlements expands the range of potential settlement agreements and explains 
the observation of reverse settlements.  Here we discuss applications of the model. 
 
A. Nuisance Example: Compensated Injunctions 
 
The general results on injunctive settlements have implications for several areas of 
litigation.  Consider, for example, a nuisance lawsuit.  Suppose the defendant is a smoke-
belching factory and the plaintiff is a class consisting of homeowners downwind from the 
factory.  A standard settlement would involve a payment from the factory to the 
homeowners, permitting the factory to continue emitting pollution.  This was the solution 
adopted as a remedy by the court in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.11  An injunctive 
settlement would involve the factory abating the pollution, perhaps by shutting down.  In 
a reverse injunctive settlement, the homeowners would pay the factory to shut down.  
This is the remedial combination first suggested in Calabresi and Melamed (1972) and 
later observed as a court order in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co.12   
 
The results of the previous section imply that the injunctive settlement is more likely to 
be observed than the standard settlement when the gain to the homeowners from the 
injunction exceeds the loss to the factory.  Thus, if the value of the homeowners’ property 
exceeds the value of the factory by a substantial amount, the injunctive settlement is 
likely to be observed.  The reverse settlement (voluntary compensated injunction) is 
likely to be observed, based on the analysis of the preceding section (Example 1 and 
Observation 1), when the stakes are high relative to the damages suffered by the 
homeowners. 
 
Example 3: Suppose the value of the homeowners’ property declines from $10 million to 
$1 million because of pollution from the defendant’s factory.  An injunction would cause 
the property value to rise back up to the initial value of $10 million.  The gain from the 
injunction would therefore be $9 million.  Suppose also that the homeowners have 
suffered some adverse health effects amounting to $1 million in damages.  Assume 
consistent beliefs with P = .6, and that the cost of litigation for the plaintiffs is $100,000.  
On the factory’s side, assume the value of the factory is $5 million, and that the factory’s 
cost of litigation is $400,000.  Given these assumptions, the homeowners’ payoff from 
litigation is (.6)($1 million) + (.6)($9 million) – $100,000 = $5.9 million.  The 
homeowners’ gain from the injunction would be $9 million.  Hence, the homeowners 
would be willing to pay up to $3.1 million for the injunctive settlement.  For the 
defendant factory, the expected cost from litigation is (.6)($1 million + $5 million) + 
$400,000 = $4 million.  An injunction imposed with certainty will cost the factory $5 
million, so it will demand a payment of $1 million to accept the proposed injunction 
rather than continue to litigate.  A reverse settlement payment between $1 million and 
                                                 
11 257 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1970). 
12 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). 
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$3.1 million will be observed.  This is consistent with the model of this paper because the 
stakes are large relative to the damages and the litigation costs.  The injunctive settlement 
effectively transfers the property right over local air quality to the party that places the 
greatest value on it. 
 
One interesting difference between the nuisance example and other instances of litigation 
is that transaction costs could present an especially formidable obstacle to the reverse 
settlement in the nuisance setting.  Suppose, in Example 3, that there are one thousand 
homeowners affected by the factory.  An injunctive settlement secured through a reverse 
payment would require each homeowner to pay a minimum average of $1,000.  Some 
homeowners might hold out on payment, hoping that others would pick up the difference.  
This is the familiar problem observed in the financing of public goods.  Since the 
opposing parties have consistent beliefs in this example, fragmentation of stakes, not 
asymmetry in stakes, is the factor that could drive them into litigation. 
 
The previous example assumes that the injunction in a nuisance dispute would be issued 
with the same probability that the court would find the existence of a nuisance.  One 
lesson of Boomer is that this is not necessarily so.  When the losses to surrounding 
property owners are small relative to the cost of shuttering the factory, a damage payment 
to the surrounding property owners may be ordered by the court instead of an injunction. 
 
If the probability of an injunction differs from that of a finding of a violation of the law, 
or if the finding of a violation leads to compensation rather than an injunction, the 
incentives governing the injunctive settlement change.  Suppose the probability of an 
injunction being issued is less than the probability of the court finding that a nuisance 
exists.  Then the defendant, aware that his factory is less likely to be shut down, will be 
more likely to demand a payment (or a larger payment) in order to agree to an injunctive 
settlement.  The plaintiff, aware that he is less likely to get the gain from an injunction 
through litigation, will be more likely to pay for an injunctive settlement.  To illustrate, 
suppose in Example 3 that the likelihood of a finding of a nuisance is .6 and the 
likelihood of an injunction being issued is .4.  Then the homeowners’ payoff from 
litigation would be (.6)($1 million) + (.4)($9 million) – $100,000 = $4 million, which 
implies that homeowners would be willing to spend up to $5 million for the injunctive 
settlement.  For the factory, the expected cost from litigation would be (.6)($1 million) + 
(.4)($5 million) + $400,000 = $3 million, which implies that the factor would need to 
receive $2 million in order to shut down voluntarily. 
 
If the court provides compensation to the plaintiff rather than an injunction the 
implications for a reverse injunctive settlement change significantly.  When 
compensation based on the economic loss the plaintiffs will be required, the conditions 
for a reverse settlement become Gp > Pp(D + βGp) – Cp for the plaintiff, and Ld > Pd(D + 
βGp) + Cd for the defendant, where β is the percentage of the plaintiffs’ economic value 
loss compensated.  When the defendant evaluates the cost of litigation, he now considers 
the compensation payment based on the plaintiffs’ value loss rather than the cost of the 
injunction to him.  When the economic value loss is large relative to the factory value, the 
factory owner may prefer the injunctive settlement to litigation, and may be willing to 
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provide a payment to plaintiffs to avoid litigation.  If, on the other hand, the factory value 
is large relative the plaintiffs’ economic value loss (or the compensation ratio is small), 
then this becomes similar to the case where the probability of the injunction is less than 
the probability of a nuisance finding.  As the compensation ratio declines, the factory 
owner demands a larger payment and the homeowners are more willing to pay it.  To 
illustrate, return to the assumptions of Example 3, and let the compensation ratio (β) be 
80%.   The plaintiff homeowners’ payoff from litigation would be (.6)($1 million) + 
(.6)(.8)($9 million) – $100,000 = $4.82 million, which implies that homeowners would 
be willing to spend up to $4.18 million for the injunction.  For the factory, the cost from 
litigation would be (.6)($1 million) + (.6)(.8)($9 million) + $400,000 = $5.32 million.  
This implies that the factory will demand a payment to shut down only if the factory’s 
value exceeds $5.32 million.  If the factory’s value is less than $5.32 million, it will 
prefer the injunctive settlement (shutting down) rather than continuing to litigate in the 
face of the risk of a large damage payment based on the plaintiffs’ loss. 
 
The structure of the nuisance problem considered here applies to many disputes.  
Consider the “fencing out” versus “fencing in” problem (Ellickson, 1991).  Two 
neighbors own adjacent parcels.  One owns cattle that roam about and damage the 
property of his neighbor.  If the victim of the damage sues the cattle owner, he may seek 
an injunction that would effectively force the cattle owner to fence in his animals.  
Instead of seeking a settlement for money that preserves the status quo, the plaintiff could 
ask for an injunctive settlement.  If the victim’s property value is large relative to the 
value the cattle owner places on the animals’ freedom to roam about, a reverse settlement 
may be observed. 
 
B. Patent Infringement 
 
The settlement model of this paper can be modified to take into account the 
considerations in patent infringement litigation.  Patent infringement litigation can be 
distinguished from nuisance litigation in several ways.  Most importantly, it is believed 
that there is a dynamic efficiency cost associated with patent infringement.  If patents are 
infringed easily with no punishment to infringers, innovators will have weak incentives to 
invent new products and processes.  
 
We will assume that there is a potential dynamic incentive cost resulting from the 
rejection of the plaintiff’s infringement claim.  Let the social cost of the dynamic 
incentive effect be .  The portion of the social cost borne by the plaintiff will be 
represented by γ. 
 
In the infringement setting, the gain to the plaintiff Gp represents the value to the plaintiff 
of the defendant’s decision to discontinue the allegedly infringing activity.  The loss to 
the defendant Ld represents the profits forgone by the defendant’s decision to discontinue 
the activity. 
 
The injunctive settlement will be desirable to the infringement plaintiff if  
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(10) S + Gp  > Pp(Gp+D) – Cp – (1–Pp) γ 
 
where the last term reflects the plaintiff’s perception of the dynamic incentive cost of 
losing his patent monopoly.  The condition determining whether the injunctive settlement 
is desirable to the defendant is the same as in the basic model: 
 
(11)  S + Ld < Pd(Ld+D) + Cd  . 
 
An injunctive settlement will observed when 
 
(12) (1–Pd)Ld – (1–Pp)Gp+ (Pp–Pd)D – (1–Pp) γ < Cp + Cd 
 
The likelihood of an injunctive settlement is greater than in the previous analysis, because 
the plaintiff is willing to pay more in order to avoid the dynamic efficiency cost. 
 
The dynamic efficiency concern is expressed in connection with infringement of 
intellectual property rights in general – with respect to patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
and trade secrets.  The framework set out here applies to injunctive settlements in all of 
these areas.  The economic analysis of the incentives for injunctive settlements, and for 
reverse settlements, does not differ substantially from what we have discussed earlier. 
 
However, one important distinguishing characteristic of infringement litigation is the 
divergence between private and social incentives to settle (Shavell, 1982b).  An 
injunctive settlement denies consumers the surplus that would be generated by the market 
entry of the alleged infringer (Shapiro, 2003). This is an element of social welfare that is 
not taken into account in the conditions governing the private incentives for settlement, 
shown in (10) and (11).  As a result, the private incentive for an injunctive settlement 
may be greater (or less) than the social incentive.  Indeed, if W is the additional consumer 
welfare generated by the entry of the alleged infringer and P is treated as the objective 
probability of infringement, an injunctive settlement will be socially desirable if and only 
if 
 
(13)    (1–P)(W + Ld) < Cp + Cd  + (1–P)  
 
This means that the social gain from litigation, which is the value of the additional 
surplus and the gain to the defendant infringer, is less than the sum of the litigation costs 
and the expected social cost of permitting infringement. 
 
Example 4: Suppose the value of the plaintiff’s patent on an invention declines from $100 
million to $20 million because of the defendant’s infringement.  An injunction would 
cause the value of the patent to increase to $80 million, the discount from one hundred 
reflecting the shorter remaining time on the patent grant.  The gain to the plaintiff 
patentee from the injunction would therefore be $60 million.  Suppose also that the 
patentee has lost market share as a result of the infringement, resulting in $10 million in 
damages.  Beliefs are consistent with P = .6.  The cost of litigation for the plaintiff 
patentee is $1 million.  On the defendant’s side, assume the value of the infringing 
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business $30 million, and that the cost of litigation for the alleged infringer is $4 million.  
Given these assumptions, the patentee’s expected award from litigation is (.6)($10 
million) + (.6)($60 million) = $42 million.  However, if the patentee loses the litigation, 
his future incentives to invent, in connection with the existing patent or for new products, 
will be diminished as will be those of similar firms.  Suppose the cost of that 
diminishment in incentives is $10 million, and the portion borne by the patentee alone is 
$5 million.  The expected cost to the patentee will therefore be (.4)($5 million) = $2 
million.  Given all of this, the patentee’s expected payoff from litigation is $42 million – 
$2million – $1million = $39 million.  The patentee’s gain from the injunction would be 
$60 million.  Hence, the patentee would be willing to pay up to $21 million for the 
injunctive settlement.  For the defendant firm, the expected cost from litigation is (.6)($10 
million + $30 million) + $4 million = $28 million.  An injunction with certainty will cost 
the alleged infringer $30 million, so it will demand a payment of $2 million to accept the 
proposed injunction rather than continue to litigate.  A reverse settlement payment 
between $2 million and $21 million will be observed.  The settlement, however, will not 
be socially desirable.  Suppose the loss in consumer welfare from the exclusion of the 
alleged infringer is only $1 million.  The social benefit from continued litigation would 
be equal to (.4)($30 million + $1 million) = $12.4 million.  The social cost of this patent 
litigation would be $1 million + $4 million + (.4)($10 million) = $9 million.  Society 
would be better off if the parties were not permitted to settle the dispute. 
 
The problems illustrated here, and especially the divergence between private and social 
incentives to settle, are observed more generally in all types of competition-blocking 
litigation.  Intellectual property infringement cases all fall within this category, and so do 
administrative proceedings associated with efforts to block competition, such as 
antidumping proceedings (Cho, 2009). 
 
C. Waivers 
 
In addition to the settlement option, an injunctive settlement could be incorporated into 
negotiations over a pre-dispute waiver agreement.  In other words, before any event 
occurs that might lead to a lawsuit, the potential plaintiff could approach the potential 
defendant and negotiate an agreement in which he promises never to sue in exchange for 
the potential defendant’s agreement to forgo the activity that might generate a lawsuit 
from the potential plaintiff.  For example, a patentee could approach a firm that might 
potentially infringe on its patent and enter into an agreement in which the patentee 
promises not to sue for infringement and the firm agrees to forgo any future activity that 
the patentee alleges is an infringement.  This type of injunctive waiver would be an 
alternative to the standard waiver, which involves just an agreement by the potential 
plaintiff to forgo his right to sue.  
 
In the standard litigation framework, private and social incentives to sue diverge because 
of the costliness of litigation (Shavell, 1982b).   In a low transaction cost setting, the 
standard waiver provides a Coasean solution to the inefficient litigation that arises 
because of this divergence (Hylton, 2000).  Whenever the deterrence benefits from 
litigation are less than the expected litigation costs, standard waivers will be exchanged 
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between potential plaintiffs and potential defendants.  However, the standard waiver 
merely eliminates the risk of inefficient litigation. The waiving party still bears the losses 
caused by the potential defendant’s activity.  The injunctive waiver can increase social 
welfare by relieving the waiving party of those losses when the waiving party attaches a 
greater value to the injunction than does the potential defendant. 
 
D. Some General Implications 
 
The model here has implications for the generation of efficient norms.  Where the stakes 
attached to legal rules are high relative to the damages in litigation, the parties may adopt 
settlement agreements that reverse the law.  Agreements of the sort examined in 
Ellickson (1991), sometimes reversing the law, are likely to be observed.  Indeed, the 
parties may adopt litigation waiver agreements that reverse the law as between 
themselves. 
 
Rubin (1977) focused on litigation as a primary force pushing the law toward efficient 
rules.  Where the stakes are high, parties will challenge inefficient legal rules in court 
more often than efficient rules.  This paper’s model suggests that settlement and waiver 
agreements will have the same effect.  Rather than challenge inefficient rules until they 
are overturned in court, this model shows that parties will sometimes have incentives to 
enter into settlement agreements that reverse the legal rule as between them.  This 
suggests a stronger push toward common law efficiency than implied in Rubin’s analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper extends the economic analysis of settlements and draws some practical 
implications for injunctive and reverse settlements.  It identifies the conditions under 
which injunctive settlements are likely to be observed and the conditions under which 
reverse settlements will be observed among the injunctive settlements.  The design space 
for settlements is considerably broader than in the traditional analysis; settlements are 
more likely to occur than acknowledged in the standard model.  Settlements may 
effectively reverse the law as between the litigants.  Asymmetric stakes are not sufficient 
to stop settlements from occurring. 
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